Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 6

1994

Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings:
The Expansion of the Social Group to Include a
Broader Class of Refugees
Peter C. Godfrey

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Peter C. Godfrey, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings: The Expansion of the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of
Refugees, 3 J. L. & Pol'y (1994).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol3/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

DEFINING THE SOCIAL GROUP IN ASYLUM
PROCEEDINGS: THE EXPANSION OF THE
SOCIAL GROUP TO INCLUDE A BROADER
CLASS OF REFUGEES
Peter C. Godfrey"

INTRODUCTION

In Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, women are
subjected to genital mutilation, while bride-burning is not uncommon in India.' In Central America, homosexuals may be legally
imprisoned and are often beaten, whereas in China, they may be
subjected to electroshock therapy.2 Remarkably, however, individuals who are persecuted as a result of gender or sexual orientation
may not have standing to assert a successful asylum claim, while
persons persecuted merely because they espouse a certain political
opinion could successfully allege such a claim.
To be granted asylum, a petitioner must be persecuted or have
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of any one of five
factors: "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 3 Recently, several U.S. courts
have narrowly construed the definition of "particular social group"
in asylum proceedings and left many persecuted individuals without

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1996. The author wishes to thank Brooklyn
Law School Professors Maryellen Fullerton and Jeffrey W. Stempel and Stephen
Smith, Brooklyn Law School Class of 1994, for their valuable assistance in the
preparation of this Note.
Jill Lawrence, Gender PersecutionNew Reason for Asylum, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1994, at 14.
2 Doris Sue Wong, More Gays Seeking U.S. Asylum, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov.
7, 1992, at 13.
3 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988)
(emphasis added).
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hope to allege a successful asylum claim. Because there is no
statutory definition of "particular social group" and courts have
inconsistently interpreted the term, it is difficult to ascertain the
limits on social groups that are recognizable under asylum law.
Individuals who fear persecution based on gender or sexual
orientation are among the groups encompassing broad demographic
divisions of society that have frequently tested the boundaries of
the "particular social group" category.4 Because persecution on
account of gender and sexual orientation are not independently
recognized as grounds for asylum, aliens seeking to escape such
persecution must fit their claims into one of the five recognized
categories.5 The "particular social group" is the only one of these
five categories into which these claims can possibly fit.
Although inclusion in the "social group" category of asylum
eligibility is the only way that those individuals persecuted because
of gender or sexual orientation may allege a successful asylum
claim, many courts have refused to recognize such individuals as
members of coherent social groups. Instead, these courts have
reasoned that members of broadly based groups often manifest
characteristics, such as a "plethora of different lifestyles, varying
interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings," which
render them too diverse a group to be recognized under asylum
6
law.
This Note examines various judicial interpretations of the term
"particular social group" and identifies the characteristics that are
indicative of the presence of such a group. By applying these
interpretations to gender and sexual orientation-based groups, this
Note argues that many individuals, who are persecuted on account
of their membership in a group, are not eligible for asylum merely

Many issues that arise in considering the asylum claims of social groups
based on gender and sexual orientation are unrelated. These two social groups are
considered together in this Note only because they share the characteristic of
encompassing a large group of people.
' The five recognized categories are race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group and political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A).
6 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the application of the term "particular social group" to a class of
young, working class, urban males of military age).
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because the group is deemed to be too broad to be considered a
particular social group under asylum law. Finally, this Note
concludes that the breadth of a social group is not a proper
consideration for determining whether a particular social group is
cognizable under asylum law.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Eligibilityfor Asylum on the Basis of Membership
in a "ParticularSocial Group"
To be statutorily eligible for asylum in the United States under
the Refugee Act of 19807 ("Refugee Act"), an alien must show he
or she is a "refugee" as defined in the Immigration and
Naturalization Act 8 ("INA"). Under the INA, a refugee is a person
outside the country of his or her nationality, who is "unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-foundedfear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particularsocial group, or political
opinion."'
7 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of

8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
' A "refugee" is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A).
9 Id. (emphasis added).
Even if an alien qualifies as a "refugee," the U.S. Attorney General retains
the authority to deny asylum claims, and discretionary factors must weigh in
favor of the alien. The U.S. asylum program deals only with aliens who are
within the borders of the United States; its provisions do not apply extraterritorially. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (holding that
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Present U.S. asylum law follows the U.N. 1951 Convention
Relating to Refugees Claims ° ("Convention") and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" ("Protocol"). The
Convention defined the term "refugee" and this definition was
adopted by the United States and more than one hundred other
signatory countries 12 in the Protocol. 3 The United States signed
the Protocol in 1968, however, U.S. asylum law did not comply
with the Protocol until Congress passed the Refugee Act of
1980.14

B. Defining the Social Group Under US. Jurisprudence
Because the Refugee Act does not define "particular social
group," one must look to case law as the primary authority on the
term's meaning. Conceptually, the "particular social group"
category provides a statutory framework whereby those persecuted
on account of a broadly based characteristic, such as gender or
sexual orientation, could foreseeably succeed in asserting an asylum

§ 243(h) does not apply extraterritorially).
10 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signature
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention].
" Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signature Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.T.S. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol].
2 Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to International Refugee
Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 495, 497 (1994) (stating that 114 countries
have ratified either the Protocol or the Convention); M.J. BOWMAN & D.H.
HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 125 (8th Cum.
Supp. 1991).
" The Protocol adopted the Convention's definition of refugee, however, it
eliminated its restriction that the events of persecution had to have been
performed before January 1, 1951 and that the departure no longer needed to be
as a result of such events. Protocol, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
'4 When the Protocol was ratified in 1968, Congress did not make any
changes in immigration statutes; instead, it relied on the attorney general's
discretion under INA § 243(h). In 1980, Congress revised INA § 208 to include
the Protocol definition of refugee and thus created the modern statutory
availability for asylum. DAVID A. MARTIN, NEW ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW
79 (1987).
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claim.15 Many U.S. courts, however, have been reluctant to
construe the category so liberally.
Several defining characteristics emerge from an analysis of the
decisions that interpret the term "particular social group." Although
the interpretations are not completely consistent with one another,
collectively they offer several characteristics that indicate the
presence of a recognizable social group. Some interpretations may
be considered expansive because they allow for the possibility that
members of large groups may be granted asylum. Other narrower
interpretations, however, impose restrictions which exclude broadly
based groups. Although all characteristics that are indicative of a
social group restrict the size of the allowable group, some make it
nearly impossible to recognize broadly based groups as statutorily
permissible social groups.
1. Expansion Interpretationsof the ParticularSocial Group
Two interpretations of the term "particular social group" include
characteristics applicable to broadly based groups. First, a social
group must be comprised of individuals who have a "common
immutable characteristic."' 6 Second, members of a social group
normally have similar "background, habits or social status."17
a. Common, Immutable Characteristics
In In re Acosta 8 , the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
broadly interpreted "persecution on account of membership in a

"5See David L. Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based
Persecutionas Groundsfor Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988)

(arguing in favor of recognizing women as a particular social group).
16 In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (BIA 1985); see also
AnanehFirempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir.1985); In re Vigil, I. & N. Interim
Dec. 3050 (1988); In re Fuentes, I. & N. Interim Dec. 3065 (1988).
17 Office of the U.N. High Comm'r For Refugees, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (Geneva,
1980) at 19, para. 77 [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
s 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
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particular social group" to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties,
or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.
The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify
under this construction remains to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. However, whatever the common
characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences. 9
Acosta based his claim for asylum on persecution that he
suffered due to his membership in alleged social groups,2" namely
"COTAXI drivers 2' and persons engaged in the transportation
industry of El Salvador., 22 In denying Acosta's asylum claim, the
BIA determined that the characteristics that defined his group were
not "immutable because the members of the group could avoid the
threats of the guerrillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating
in work stoppages. '"23

9 Id. at 234

(emphases added); see also Saleh v. INS, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d

Cir. 1992); Ananeh-Firempong,766 F.2d at 621, 626; Vigil, I. & N. Interim Dec.
at 3050; Fuentes, I. & N. Interim Dec. at 3065.
20 Acosta also sought asylum on account of his political opinion. This claim
was also rejected by the BIA. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211, 234.
21 Acosta was a founder and manager of a taxi driver cooperative in El
Salvador called COTAXI. COTAXI members were threatened by what they
believed to be antigovernment guerrillas who had targeted small businesses in the
transportation industry for work stoppages, in hopes of damaging El Salvador's
economy. COTAXI's board of directors refused to comply with the requests
because its members wished to keep working, and as a result COTAXI received
threats of retaliation which resulted in the seizing and burning of five taxis and
the death of five COTAXI drivers. After he was assaulted and received three
threatening notes, Acosta fled El Salvador because he feared for his life. Id. at
229.
22 Id. at 235.
23 Id. at 234.
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The immutable characteristic test set forth by the BIA in Acosta
[hereinafter "Acosta test"] imposes no significant limits on the
breadth of the allowable social group. Further, the BIA cites sex as
a typical characteristic that could define a social group.24 Thus,
Acosta recognizes the existence of social groups defined by broadly
based characteristics which may include those defined by the
gender or sexual orientation of their members.
b. Similar Background Habits or Social Status
A second characteristic of a particular social group is that
"members have similar background, habits or social status"25
[hereinafter "Handbook test"]. The flexibility of this definition
allows the social group category to frequently overlap with other
grounds of persecution. 6 This characteristic, originally defined in
the Handbook on Procedures and Criteriafor determining the
Status of Refugees [hereinafter "Handbook"],27 has generally been
considered authoritative.28
In Ananeh-Firempong v INS29 , the First Circuit coupled the
Handbook test with the Acosta test to develop its definition of a
particular social group.3" Ananeh-Firempong, a Ghanian woman
24 Id.
25 HANDBOOK,
26 HANDBOOK,
27 HANDBOOK,

supra note 17, at 19, para. 77 (emphasis added).
supra note 17, at 19, para. 77.
supra note 17. The Handbook, a publication of the Office of

the U.N. High Commissioners for Refugees, was intended as a practical guide
signatories to the Protocol and the Convention, concerned with the determination
of refugee status. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 1.
28 See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985);
Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1984). But see
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
although the Handbook is authoritative, it provides little guidance in construing
the meaning of "particular social group").
29 766 F.2d at 621, 626.
30
A "[p]articular social group" normally comprises persons of
similar background,habits or socialstatus.. . . Membership
of [sic] such a particular social group may be at the root of
persecution because there is no confidence in the group's
loyalty to the Government or because the political outlook,
antecedents or economic activity of its members, or the very
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seeking asylum, alleged that she suffered persecution on account of
her membership in three social groups: (1) people associated with
the former government; (2) members of the Ashanti tribe; and (3)
professionals, businesspeople and the highly educated. 3' Although
the court did not specify the social group to which she belonged,
it regarded her situation as persecution on account of membership
in a particular social group.32 The court stated that the facts
brought Ananeh-Firempong "squarely within the Handbook
definition" of social group and that the characteristics that made her
eligible for asylum were "essentially beyond the [AnanehFirempong's] power to change."33
The Handbook test, like the Acosta test, does not limit the
breadth of the recognizable group because it is possible that a
group of any size could have the same background, habits, or social
status.
2.

Judicial InterpretationsNarrowing the Social Group

Several characteristics of a recognizable particular social group
limit the term to narrowly defined groups. Although none of the
narrower interpretations expressly limit the size of the allowable
groups, all pose difficulties for aliens who seek asylum based on
persecution due to their membership in such large groups.
Three interpretations of particular social group can be viewed
as posing such difficulties. In Sanchez-Trujillo v INS,34 the Ninth
Circuit imposed two requirements on the classification of a social
group. First, the court held that there must be a close affiliation
between the members, and second, it held that there must be a
voluntary associational relationship among the members.35 A third
requirement that courts sometimes impose in deciding if a

existence of the social group as such, is held to be an
obstacle to the Government's policies.
Id. at 626 (citing HANDBOOK at 19, paras. 77-78 (emphasis added by the court)).
3"Id. at 623.

Id. at 626.
" Id. at 626.
34 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
32

35Id.
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particular social group is recognizable is that there be a characteristic that distinguishes the group members in the eyes of the
persecutor.36
a. Sanchez-Trujillo Interpretation
In Sanchez-Trujillo, the Ninth Circuit held that a class of
young, urban, working-class, politically neutral El Salvadorian
males of military age did not qualify as a particular social group
for the purpose of qualifying as refugees.37 The court stated that
such a group "may be so broad and encompass so many variables
that to recognize any person who might conceivably establish that
he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum would render
the definition of 'refugee' meaningless., 38 Consequently, the court
offered the following interpretation of "particular social group":
The statutory words "particular" and "social" which modify
"group," . .. indicate that the term does not encompass
every broadly defined segment of a population, even if a
certain demographic division does have some statistical
relevance. Instead, the phrase "particular social group"
implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each
other, who are actuated by some common impulse or
interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary
associationalrelationshipamong the purported members,
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social
group.

39

Thus, the Sanchez-Trujillo court offers two characteristics that
define the term "particular social group." First, a social group must
be a cohesive, homogeneous group of people, closely affiliated with
each other, who are united by some common impulse or interest.4 °
Second, there should be a voluntary associational relationship
among the purported members, which imparts some common
See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
" Id. at 1577 (quoting the decision of the immigration judge).
'9Id. at 1576 (emphases added).
36

17

40

Id.
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characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as members of
that discrete social group. 4' Both of these characteristics impede
the recognition of social groups that are defined by broad character4
istics. 1

'The stringent requirement of a "close affiliation" between
members effectively limits the application of the term "particular
social group" to small groups. Broadly based groups, such as those
defined by gender or sexual orientation, cannot realistically be
considered closely affiliated because their members naturally have
different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures and contrary
political leanings.43 Because broad groups manifest these common
characteristics, they cannot be "actuated by a common impulse or
interest[s]",44 and would not be considered social groups under the
Sanchez-Trujillo interpretation of the term. Consistent with this
interpretation, courts that have imposed the requirement of a close
affiliation between members have indicated that characteristics, like
gender, are insufficient to be the unifying factor in a social
group.45
The second requirement of the Sanchez-Trujillo interpretation,
41 Id.

The Sanchez-Trujillo interpretation of particular social group severely
limits the breadth of the allowable group. The Ninth Circuit based its limitations,
in large part, on the inclusion of the word "particular" within the phrase
"particular social group." The court reasoned that the word is an indication of an
intent to limit the scope of the allowable social group. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801
F.2d at 1576. But see T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a ParticularSocial
Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of
Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 925 (1992) (stating that the word "particular"
is necessitated by the grammatical construction of the sentence and if the word
was omitted, the words of the statute would only protect those persecuted on
account of "membership in the class of people consisting of all those who are
members of any social group").
43 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575 (holding that a class of young, working
class, urban males is not a recognizable social group). But see Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: PoliticalAsylum and the Global
Persecutionof Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 605, 612 (1994)
(arguing that a close affiliative relationship exists among homosexuals).
41 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
41 See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); SanchezTrujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-77.
42
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the presence of a voluntary, associational relationship that imparts
a common characteristic fundamental to the group members'
identity limits the scope of the term to small groups. In an attempt
to illustrate the types of groups deserving recognition as "particular
social groups," the Ninth Circuit held that the term should apply to
"cohesive, homogeneous groups, ' '46 and that a family is a
"prototypical example of a 'particular social group"' while a
"statistical group of males taller than six feet would not constitute
a 'particular social group' .. . even if individuals with such
characteristics could be shown
to be at greater risk of persecution
47
than the general population.,
Scholars have criticized the Sanchez-Trujillo definition of
particular social group,48 suggesting that the definition itself is
flawed and self-defeating because the voluntary associational
relationship requirement is at odds with the court's statement that
a "family" is a prototypical example of a social group.49 One
possible explanation for this ambiguity is that in a typical familial
relationship-as opposed to a mere biological relationship-members voluntarily choose to associate with one another.
Such willful association can be seen as imparting the characteristic
fundamental to the family members identity. Thus, it is not the
involuntary characteristic of a biological relationship among
members of a family that makes it a prototypical social group, but
the conscious choice to associate with other family members.
Nevertheless, this ambiguity leaves the court's intent open to
speculation.
Scholars have also argued that the requirement of a voluntary
associational relationship contradicts the Acosta "immutable

46
47
48

Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.

Id. at 1576.

See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status
Based on Persecution Due to Membership in Particular Social Group, 26
CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 505, 555 (1994); Goldberg, supra note 43, at 612; Parish,
supra note 42, at 923; Neal, supra note 15, at 225; Daniel Compton, Recent
Development:Asylum for PersecutedSocialGroups: A ClosedDoor Left Sightly
Ajar, 62 WASH. L. REv. 913 (1987).
49 See Fullerton, supra note 48, at 556; Parish, supra note 42, at 942.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
characteristic" requirement.5 ° Acosta imparts some element of
involuntariness by requiring that there is an inability to disassociate
oneself from the group. However, it is clear that the SanchezTrujillo court did not intend the voluntary associational relationship
requirement to be a rejection of the "immutable characteristic"
requirement of Acosta." The requirement that the voluntary
associational relationship be "fundamental" to the group member's
identity seems to be an attempt by the court to embrace this
requirement of an immutable characteristic. Thus, this voluntary
associational relationship requirement can be interpreted
consistently with Acosta if it refers to a common characteristic,
fundamental to a group member's identity, that arises from the
desire to associate with other group members.
Although the Sanchez-Trujillo court's interpretation is somewhat
open to speculation, it offers two characteristics that define the term
"particular social group." First, it must be a cohesive, homogeneous
group of people, closely affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by some common impulse or interest. Second, there should
be a voluntary associational relationship among the members,
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to
their identity as a member of that discrete social group. Both of
these characteristics can pose difficulties for recognition of broadly
based social groups.
b. Distinguishing Characteristic
Several courts have applied an additional restriction to the
definition of particular social group, holding that the group must
possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves
to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor or the outside world
in general. 2 While this principle does not, on its face, act to

So

Parish, supra note 42, at 942.

"' Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (citing Acosta requirement with
approval).
52 Saleh v. INS, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1992); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d
660 (2d Cir. 1991); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990); cf
Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986); Zepeda-Melendezv.
INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984); Chavezv. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434
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narrow the size of a recognizable social group, its further
qualifications have limited the recognizable distinguishing characteristics. Generally, "[p]ossession of a broadly based characteristic
such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular social group." 3 Where broadly based
characteristics are insufficient to define a social group, the
distinguishing characteristic requirement acts to narrow the scope
of the recognizable social group.
3. Conclusions About the Definition of ParticularSocial Group
Under U.S. Jurisprudence
The foregoing decisions define five characteristics that U.S.
courts have found relevant when interpreting the term "particular
social group." It should be noted, however, that as case law in this
area has developed, courts have not consistently relied on all of the
characteristics set forth in previous decisions. The weight that
should be given to each characteristic is also unclear.
First, a particular social group must be based on some immutable characteristic that is either beyond the alien's power to change
or so fundamental to the individual's identity that he or she ought
not to be required to change it.54 Second, a particular social group,
"normally comprises persons of similar background, habits or social
status." 5 These two characteristics may apply to a group of
almost any size, however, the remaining characteristics have been
imposed to limit the scope of the recognizable group to one that is
relatively small.
Third, "a particular social group" implies a cohesive, homogeneous group, whose members are closely affiliated with each other
and actuated by some common impulse or interest.16 Fourth, there
should be a voluntary associational relationship among the

(9th Cir. 1984).
11 Saleh, 962 F.2d at 240; Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664; see Sanchez-Trujillo, 801
F.2d at 1574-77 (denying asylum to "young urban males").
14 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (BIA 1985); see also
AnanehFirempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985).
55 HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 19, para. 77.
56 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
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purported members, which imparts some common characteristic that
is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social
group.57 Finally, the group members should possess some
narrowly defined, fundamental common characteristic which serves
to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor or in the eyes of the
outside world in general.58
II. EXTENSION OF THE "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP" TO INCLUDE
GENDER-BASED GROUPS

A. The Present State of the Law
To date, courts applying U.S. asylum law have never granted
asylum to anyone persecuted on account of gender by recognizing
him or her as a member of a particular social group.59 Most of the
arguments in favor of including those who suffer gender-based
persecution as members of a recognizable social group, a group
possibly eligible for asylum, have centered around the persecution
of women.
7

58

id.
See Saleh v. INS, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1992); Gomez v. INS, 947

F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir.
1990); Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 623.
'9 See Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution
on the Basis of Membership in a ParticularSocial Group, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
173 (1993); Ninette Kelley, Report on the InternationalConsultationon Refugee
Women, Geneva, 15-19 November 1988, with ParticularReference to Protection
Problems, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 233, 235 (1989).
In some cases, however, men and women who have been persecuted in
gender-specific ways have been granted asylum by basing their claims on one of
the more traditional theories of asylum law. For example, in Lazo-Majano v. INS,
813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a Salvadorian
woman, who had been subjected to repeated rapes and been accused of
subversive activities, based on the persecution that she received due to her
political opinion. In a recent case, U.S. Immigration Judge Kendall Warren
granted a woman asylum on "humanitarian grounds" because her daughters
would been subjected to a genital mutilating operation had they been sent to
Nigeria. Nigerian National Wins Fight to Halt Deportation: Daughters Faced
Genital Mutilation, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 24, 1994, at A-11.
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In many countries, women are subject to persecution which is
inflicted upon them merely because of their gender. For example,
in many parts of the world, women are subjected to sexual
assault,6" forced prostitution and genital mutilation.61 In the United
States, many immigration judges and federal courts have narrowly
construed the term "particular social group," providing no ground
for asylum for women who are persecuted due only to their gender.
The courts primarily object to granting asylum to gender-based
groups because the breadth of the group.62
B. Applying US. Jurisprudence to a "Particular Social
Group" of Aliens Persecuted on Account of Gender
Under U.S. asylum jurisprudence, as exemplified in the five
aforementioned characteristics that are indicative of the presence of
a recognizable social group, it is difficult for a gender-based group
to be considered a "particular social group." Although the Acosta
and Handbook interpretations support the inclusion of gender-based
groups, the Sanchez-Trujillo requirements and the distinguishing
characteristic requirement pose formidable barriers that, if applied,
make it nearly impossible to recognize gender as the defining
characteristic of a particular social group.
First, gender-based groups are clear examples of groups defined
by an immutable characteristic, as required in the Acosta definition
of the particular social group. 63 Gender is an immutable characteristic that is generally beyond an individual's power to change.
Further, Acosta names "sex" as an example of a common

60 Deborah Sontag, Rape Raisedas an ImmigrationIssue, S.D. UNION-TRIB.,
Sept. 27, 1993, at A-8.
61 Mark Waller, Women: Female Circumcision Report Outrages Refugee

Conference, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 8, 1993 (referring to an operation
common in Somalia whereby the clitoris is removed from young women).
62 The factors that limit the breadth of the allowable social group are the
Sanchez-Trujillo requirements of a close affiliation and a voluntary associational
relationship, and the requirement of the distinguishing characteristic.
63 JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 162-63 (1991)
(referring to both gender-based and sexual orientation-based groups as particular
social groups that satisfy the Acosta, immutable characteristic definition).
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characteristic that could constitute a particular social group.64
Some courts have considered this requirement paramount and have
found social groups present where an immutable characteristic is
present without considering any other characteristics.65 Such
interpretations would provide asylum to people who are persecuted
simply because of their sex.
Second, a gender-based group might be "comprised of persons
of similar background, habits, or social status. '66 For example, it
is possible that a country may afford an inferior social status to all
women or that background might be construed broadly enough to
include Islamic women in Iran. 67 Although gender-based claims
satisfy the immutable characteristic definition of particular social
group and could foreseeably satisfy the Handbook requirements for
such classification, the other principles mentioned above 68 further
limit the application of the term.
The Sanchez- Trujillo and distinguishing characteristic requirements limit the size of recognizable "social groups," placing groups
defined by gender outside the reach of U.S. asylum law. A genderbased "particular social group" fails to satisfy the third principle
that the group be cohesive and homogeneous, with members who
are closely affiliated with each other, and actuated by some
common impulse or interest. 69 It is very unlikely that a close
affiliation between members exists in a social group defined only
by gender. Fourth, the possibility that voluntary associational
relationships exist among the purported members is similarly
70
unlikely.
Fifth, it is difficult for gender-based group members to possess
a fundamental characteristic in common, which distinguishes group

In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 231 (BIA 1985).
See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that a woman who alleges persecution in Iran simply because she is a woman,
is a member of a recognizable social group, but not granting asylum because
there was no persecution).
66 HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 19, para. 77.
67 See, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1233; see Neal, supra note 15, at 207.
61 See discussion supra pp. 264-270.
69 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
64
65

70

Id.
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members in the eyes of their persecutors or in the eyes of the
outside world 7' because courts have referred specifically to
"gender" as an example of a characteristic that is too broad to be
the distinguishing characteristic in a social group.72 Thus, interpretations of the term "particular social group" that the breadth of the
term are the principal objections to the awarding of asylum to
gender-based groups.
C. Results in Gender-Based PersecutionCases
U.S. courts have consistently decided that the term "particular
social group" should -not be extended to include groups of aliens
persecuted on account of gender. This conclusion is generally based
on an objection to the size of the group. Federal courts in SanchezTrujillo and In re Vigil held that certain male gender-based groups
do not constitute particular social groups under asylum statutes.
Although recent scholarly work and debate on the subject has
concerned gender-based social groups comprised of women, there
are few cases that directly address the issue of whether a group of
women can constitute a "particular social group." The following
two cases are indicative of the way the issue is handled by the
courts.
In Fatin v INS,73 the Third Circuit based its analysis primarily
on Acosta, ignoring both the Sanchez-Trujillo characteristics and
the distinguishing feature characteristics. The Third Circuit stated
that Fatin was a member of a recognizable social group because
Acosta "specifically mentioned 'sex' as an innate characteristic that
could link the members of a 'particular social group,"' and Fatin
"suggests that she would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear
that she would be persecuted in Iran simply because she is a
74
woman."

71

See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); De Valle v.

INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990).
72 See, e.g., Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
13 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
74 Id. at 1237. The court went on to deny Fatin's asylum claims reasoning
that Fatin had "not shown that she would suffer or that she has a well founded
fear of suffering 'persecution' based solely on her gender." Id.
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Contrarily, in Gomez v INS,75 the Second Circuit rejected a
woman's claim for asylum, basing its decision in large part on the
Sanchez-Trujillo and distinguishing characteristic requirements.76
Gomez was an El Salvadorian woman who based her claim for
asylum on a fear of persecution because of her membership in the
social group of "women previously raped by the guerrillas.", 77 The
Second Circuit denied Gomez's asylum claim, noting that although
women who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by
attackers can have a well-founded fear of persecution, Gomez failed
to "demonstrate that the guerrillas are inclined or will seek to harm
her based on her association with a particular social group or on
account of any other ground enumerated in the Act., 78 The court
also expressly stated that youth and gender are characteristics that
are not sufficient to satisfy the common distinguishing characteristic
requirement of a "particular social group., 79 Gomez is indicative
of the objections to recognizing gender as a social group encountered when applying the Sanchez-Trujillo and distinguishing
characteristic requirements.
III.

EXTENSION OF THE "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP" TO INCLUDE
SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED GROUPS

A.

The Present State of the Law

Homosexuals ° who claimed persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group have had better results than
those seeking asylum with gender-based claims. In many countries,

71 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
76

Id. at 664.

77 Id. at 663. Carmen Gomez sought asylum claiming that she had been

raped and beaten by guerrillas. Cf Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 28890 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying the petition for asylum of another El Salvadorian
woman who had been raped by guerrillas).
78 Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663.
79 Id. at 664.
80 The same arguments that apply to homosexuals can also be applied to
bisexual men and women.
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homosexuals are singled out for persecution due to their sexual
orientation. For example, China attempts to treat homosexuals with
electroshock therapy,"' while in Iran, homosexuals are executed,
and in Nicaragua, homosexuals are subjected to a three-year jail
term if they "promote, propagandize or practice" homosexuality in
a "scandalous manner.,1 2 A recent report indicated that there are
at least two dozen claims for asylum based on persecution due to
membership in a social group defined by sexual orientation
pending.83 One such claim is from a Nicaraguan man who fears
imprisonment following his country's recent outlawing of homosexuality; another is from an Iranian man who claims that homosexuals
in Iran have been decapitated under the Ayatollahs. 4
At least as long as President Bill Clinton remains in office,
these claims are likely to be successful. A recent order, signed by
U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, has instructed U.S. immigration
boards to recognize sexual orientation-based social groups.
B. Historical Perspective on Homosexuals and Asylum
Historically, rather than offering a possible ground for an
asylum claim, an alien's admission that he or she was homosexual
was considered a potential ground for exclusion. 5 In Boutilier v
INS, the Supreme Court determined that homosexuals have
"psychopathic personalities" and thus, "homosexuals and other sex
perverts" should be ineligible for any lawful immigration to the

SI
82

Wong, supra note 2, at 13.
David Tuller, Political Asylum for Gays? America's Sexual Refugees,

NATION,
83

Apr. 19, 1993, at 520.

Elaine Korry, NationalPublic Radio Show: All Things Considered(Aug.

28, 1993) (transcript available on LEXIS); see also David Tuller, Immigration
Rules on Persecution: Gay Foreigners Try a New Way to Stay, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 27, 1993, at A l (stating that on September 29, 1992, there were already at
least one dozen such cases in existence).
84 Charles Fenyvesi, Washington Whispers,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
28, 1993, at 18.
85 Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). But see Hill v. INS, 714
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting a homosexual asylum).
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However, the Immigration Act of 19907 revised
the statutory grounds for exclusion and removed any possibility of
such exclusion based on sexual orientation. Thus, the possibility of
asylum for a member of a persecuted social group comprised of
homosexuals is a recent development in U.S. asylum law and very
few courts have considered the issue.
United States.

C. US. Jurisprudenceand the Exclusion of Homosexuals as a
"ParticularSocial Group"
Although U.S. asylum jurisprudence yields a result that is more
favorable to homosexuals than women, an analysis of the five
characteristics that define the social group"8 reveals a similar result
to that reached on gender-based persecution: sexual orientationbased groups may be too broad to be considered particular social
groups under an analysis that defers to the Sanchez-Trujillo and
distinguishing characteristic requirements.
First, the Acosta immutable characteristic definition favors
extending the particular social group to those who fear persecution
based on homosexuality, 9 because like gender, homosexuality is
generally considered to be an immutable characteristic that is
beyond the alien's power to change or it is so fundamental to the
individual's identity that it ought not to be required to change. 90
Second, the Handbook "similar background, habits or social
status," requirement could, under certain circumstances, support
recognizing sexual orientation-based groups as "particular social

86
87

Boutilier, 397 U.S. at 118-22.
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990) (Congress

repealed, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988)).
88 See discussion supra pp. 269-70.
89 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
9 In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 588, slip op. at 14 (July 26, 1993). Although
one could argue that being a homosexual is a matter of choice, for the purposes
of this Note, the author assumes that homosexuality is an innate and immutable
characteristic that is beyond the homosexual's power to change. See A. BELL,
SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 186-87 (1981);
FRANCIS B. MCMAHON & JUDITH W. MCMAHON, PSYCHOLOGY: THE HYBRID

SCIENCE 476-79 (5th ed. 1986).
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groups."'" Homosexuals may acquire a unique social status and
suffer persecution on account of that status. Consequently, courts
have held that individuals who are persecuted because of their
status as homosexuals may be awarded asylum based on membership in a persecuted social group.9 2
Characteristics that limit the breadth of the term "particular
social group" may apply more favorably to sexual orientation-based
groups than to gender-based groups, however, the ultimate
conclusion is the same. As with a gender-based group, the greatest
obstacle to extending the "particular social group" to homosexuals
is the size of the group. The third characteristic that the group must
be considered a "cohesive, homogeneous group, closely affiliated
with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or
interest"9 3 may preclude homosexuals from succeeding in claims
for asylum based on membership in a particular social group
because it is impossible for members of such an expansive group
to be closely affiliated with each other. Homosexuals, as a group,
cannot be said to be any more closely affiliated than heterosexuals
because they represent a large cross-section of society, having
nothing more in common than sexual orientation.
Fourth, in contradistinction to the result in gender-based asylum
claims, there may possibly be a voluntary associational relationship
among some homosexuals which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as members of that
discrete social group.94 Homosexual relationships are voluntary
associational relationships and in many cases, homosexuals
voluntarily "deny their [sexual] identity and avoid association with
others as a matter of self-preservation." 95
Fifth, the distinguishing characteristic requirement would also
support the classification of homosexuals as a social group.
Homosexuals may possess a fundamental characteristic in common
which may serve to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor or
9' Tenorio, slip op. at 13.
92

See, e.g., In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (Feb. 3, 1986), aff'd, No. A23

220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990).
9' Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986).
94 Id.

9' Goldberg, supra note 43, at 612.

278

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the outside world in general.96 However, if broadly based characteristics such as gender and youth are insufficient for drawing such
a distinction, 97 it is likely that the broadly based characteristic of
sexual orientation will likewise be insufficient. As with genderbased groups, the greatest problem with the classification of
homosexuals as members of a "particular social group," is the
breadth of the group. With the exception of the requirement of a
"closely affiliated group," and the general rejection of large groups,
U.S. jurisprudence arguably favors the extension of the term
"particular social group" to include groups of homosexuals.
D. Results in Sexual Orientation-BasedPersecution Cases
Some homosexuals seeking asylum due to persecution on
account of membership in a particular social group have obtained
favorable results despite failing to satisfy the exclusionary SanchezTrujillo requirement of a close affiliative relationship or the
requirement of a narrowly defined distinguishing characteristic.
Marcelo Tenorio, a homosexual originally from Brazil, was
among the first people to be granted asylum on account of his
persecution for being homosexual.98 The San Francisco Immigration
Court considered all of the five characteristics noted above with the
exception of the requirement that the group be "closely
affiliated."99 The court ultimately based its decision on a Canadian
court's interpretation of "particular social group."' 0 The Tenorio
court's determination that homosexuals qualify as a "particular
96

Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); De Valle v. INS, 901

F.2d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 588 (July 26, 1993).
" Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
9'Tenorio, slip op. at 14; see also In re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (Feb. 3,
1986), aff'd, No. A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (withholding deportation of
homosexual on basis of membership in particular social group).
99 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
.00The Canadian court held that a homosexual persecuted because of his
homosexuality could be considered a Convention refugee within the Immigration
Act of Canada (same definition of "refugee" as the Immigration Act of 1990)
because homosexuality is an immutable characteristic and even if it were a
voluntary condition, it is so fundamental to a person's identity that he or she
ought not be compelled to change it.
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social group" is sound with respect to the issues that the court
confronts; however, the decision is problematic because there is no
explanation of how the decision can be reconciled with the
requirement that the group be closely affiliated.
The same flaw can be found in previous decisions granting
asylum to homosexuals. In In re Toboso, I°' an immigration court
and the BIA relied primarily on the liberal Acosta interpretation of
social group, requiring only that the persecution be on account of
an immutable characteristic. The Toboso court did not inquire into
the Sanchez-Trujillo close affiliation and voluntary associational
or the distinguishing characteristic
relationship requirements
2
requirement.

10

E. Conclusions About US.Jurisprudence
In applying the five characteristics that define the particular
social group to the groups comprised by gender and sexual
orientation, it is evident that the Sanchez-Trujillo requirements and
the distinguishing characteristic requirement may prevent members
of broadly based groups from successfully asserting asylum claims.
However, not all courts have applied these limiting requirements in
determining whether a particular group is recognizable under U.S.
asylum law.
Two distinct lines of analyses have developed in U.S. courts.
Some courts, most notably the Ninth and Second Circuits have
rigidly applied both the Sanchez-Trujillo requirements of a close
affiliation and a voluntary associational relationship and also
applied the narrowly defined, distinguishing characteristic requirement. These courts have not recognized the existence of a social
group when confronted with groups defined by broadly based
characteristic such as gender. 1 3 Other courts, most notably the
Third Circuit, have applied only the Acosta immutable characteristic requirement or the Handbook similar background, habits or
re Toboso, No. A23 220 644 (Feb. 3, 1986), aff'd, No. A23 220 644
(BIA Mar. 12, 1992).
102 Toboso, No. A23 220 644, slip op. at 4-5.
103 See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); SanchezTrujillo, 801 F.2d at 1571, 1576.
101 In
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social status requirement and have recognized the existence of
broadly defined social groups.104
IV

EXPANDING THE "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP" TO INCLUDE A
BROADER CLASS OF REFUGEES

Group size is perhaps the greatest obstacle to extension of the
"particular social group" to include those who fear persecution on
account of membership in a broadly based group such as gender or
sexual orientation.105 The limitation on group size emanates from
the restrictive Sanchez-Trujillo requirements and the distinguishing
characteristic requirement. Upon consideration of the reasons for
these requirements, it becomes evident that they are unwarranted.
A.

"Opening the Floodgates"

The concern with allowing an expansive interpretation of the
particular social group is that it will "open the floodgates" to vast
demographic divisions of people in oppressed countries throughout
the world in contradiction to the United States's restrictive asylum
refugee policies. 6 Because the fear of persecution "need not be
based on an individual's own personal experience. . ." but, rather,
may stem from the persecution of others who are similarly
situated,0 7 this concern is compounded.
Thus, courts may fear that if immigration statutes are so broadly
construed as to provide asylum in such instances, any individual
persecuted on account of gender or sexual orientation may
successfully allege an asylum claim based merely on membership
in his or her respective social group. Such a construction could be
used to circumvent the narrow selection process used to determine
who is a bona fide "refugee" and who is simply dissatisfied with

104

See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying only

on the immutable characteristic test).

10' See discussion supra p. 266.
106 Bower, supra note 59, at 175;

Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576-77.

see also Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664-65;

"01 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A); see also HANDBOOK,

supra note 17, at 13, para. 43.
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the social or economic conditions in his or her country of origin.
This sentiment was echoed in Sanchez-Trujillo, where the court
stated that a particular "social group" comprised of "young, urban,
working-class males of military age," who had maintained political
neutrality, "may be so broad and encompass so many variables that
to recognize any person who might conceivably establish that he
was a member of this class is entitled to asylum ...would render
the definition of 'refugee' meaningless."'' 8

B. Why Class Size is not a ProperJudicial Concern
There are many compelling reasons why the possible size of the
recognizable social group should not be of judicial concern in
asylum claims.
1. Ejusdem Generis
Under the ejusdem generis principle of statutory interpretation,0 9 because the other specific categories listed in the Refugee
Act, namely, race, nationality, religion and political opinion, all
refer to very broadly defined groups, so should the general category
of social group."0 If the term, "particular social group," is
construed consistently with the other terms in the refugee definition, the extension to groups such as those based on gender or
sexual orientation, is a natural and correct interpretation of the
term.
In In re Acosta, the BIA was guided by the ejusdem generis
principle and
observed that [since] each of the four specific grounds concerned an immutable characteristic that individuals are
loB

Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.

109

Ejusdem generis, is a canon of statutory construction that literally means

"of the same kind, class or nature." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed.
1990). "Where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of
things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the
same general class as those enumerated." Id.
110 HATHAWAY, supra note 63, at 163.
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"unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience
should not be required" to change, the Board established a
similar "immutable characteristic" test to guide
interpretation of the particular social group category."'
11 2
Although they have also been the subject of some criticism,
canons of statutory interpretation are generally recognized as
informative in determining legislative intent and the meaning of
statutory words." 3 Of primary importance when applying the
ejusdem generis canon is that it cannot be used to restrict a general
term to an overly narrow interpretation." 4 Because application of
ejusdem generis would not restrict the term "particular social
group," but rather give it the same broad impart and scope as the
other terms in the statute, the application of the canon is proper and
the interpretation fostered by such construction is statutorily sound.
2.

Concern Is Not Warranted

The concerns voiced by the Sanchez-Trujillo court and echoed
by others is unwarranted. There is no evidence that allowing
groups, such as those defined by gender or sexual orientation, to
satisfy the particular social group definition, will lead to an
overwhelming influx of aliens seeking asylum on such grounds." 5
Three factors support the assertion that the concern about "opening
the floodgates" is not warranted. First, the number of asylum
claims, based on gender or sexual orientation in other signatory
countries" 6 that recognize these social groups for the purpose of

...Nancy Kelly, Gender-RelatedPersecution:Assessing the Asylum Claims
of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 649 (1994) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)).
112 See, e.g., W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION
AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

639 (1988).

United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975) (recognizing that ejusdem
generis will be applied unless its application would defeat legislative intent).
" 4 Karl N. Llewllyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision & the
Rules or Cannons About How Cannons are Construed,3 VAND. L. REV 395,
401-06 (1950).
.s Neal, supra note 15, at 225.
116 Supra note 4.
"
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granting asylum," 7 is relatively small compared to the total
number of claims for asylum in those countries.118 Consequently,
it is unreasonable to expect a different result if the United States
were to recognize these groups.
Second, although the fear of persecution does not have to be
based on an individual's own personal experience and it may also
stem from fear derived from the persecution of others who are
similarly situated, the requirement of real fear still exists." 9
Generally, mere membership in a persecuted group is not, in itself,
sufficient to recognize a well-founded fear. 2 Thus, not every
member of a group that is persecuted will be eligible for asylum,
and granting asylum to a member of a persecuted social group is
not tantamount to granting asylum to every member of that group
who seeks asylum.
For example, in Tenorio, an expert witness named Dr. Mott,
who testified on Tenorio's behalf about the atrocities that homosexuals are subjected to in Brazil, was a homosexual who resided in
Brazil.12 ' Although Dr. Mott was a member of the same social
group of homosexuals upon which Tenorio successfully asserted his
asylum claim, he would not have been granted asylum if he applied
because he stated that due to his "social status," he did not fear
22
persecution. 1
Third, although a broadly based characteristic can be the
common defining factor of a social group, as a practical point, only
subgroups are usually eligible for asylum. A broadly based
characteristic may be only one of several common characteristics
that defines a group, but the size of the group is necessarily limited
117 See, e.g., In re Inaudi, File No. T91 04459 (Immigration & Refugee
Board, Canada, Apr. 9, 1992).
..
8 There is no indication, in countries that have granted asylum to social
groups persecuted on account of gender or sexual orientation, that immigration
courts have been overwhelmed by asylum seekers from such groups. Cf.,
Goldberg, supra note 43, at 622 (discussing isolated cases of Canadian courts
granting asylum to homosexuals).
,"9 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
120 Compton, supra note 48, at 915; see, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801
F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986).
.2.
In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 588, slip op. at 8-11 (July 26, 1993).
122 Id.
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by the application of additional defining characteristics. For
example, a broadly based social group defined by gender will be
limited by other qualities such as a country or geographic area of
origin, race, color, or any other descriptive characteristic.' 23 The
application of these defining terms limit the potentially enormous
social group defined by gender, all human beings of the same sex,
to the smaller subgroup of men or women in a particular country
or area affected by the specific circumstances.
3. Comparative Law
Because the United States has joined more than one hundred
nations in becoming a party to the Convention, and thus, in
adopting the Convention definition of refugee, interpretation by
other signatories is helpful in defining "refugee" in the United
States.' 24 Courts in several other signatory countries have developed the definition of the term "particular social group," as that
term applies in the Convention definition of "refugee." The foreign
courts have construed the term more liberally than U.S. courts and
have granted asylum to large groups, including both gender and
sexual-orientation-based groups. For example, Canadian courts have
'
recognized both "Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse"125
2
6
and homosexual men' as "particular social groups." German
courts have suggested that women, who have based their claims for
asylum on membership in the particular social group of women
who marry men of a lower caste and the group of women active in
women's civil rights organizations, do comprise a particular social
group. 27 Thus, comparative law supports extending the particular
social group to include those who fear persecution based on broad

123
124

125

See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1993).
See generally Fullerton, supra note 48, at 505.
Fullerton, supra note 48, at 537-38 (citing to MinisterofEmployment and

Immigration v. Meyers, A-44-92, Nov. 5, 1992).
126 See In re Tenorio, A72 093 558, slip op. at 14 (July 26, 1993) (citing
to
CRDD T-91-04459, April 9, 1992).
127Fullerton, supra note 48, at 29 (citing to judgment of Jan. 4, 1985, No.
AN 1269-XII/79, VerwaltungsgerichtAnsbach(Ansbach Administrative Court)).
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characteristics, such as gender and sexual orientation.1 21 American
jurisprudence should be informed by the interpretations offered by
other courts construing the term.
4. Purpose of the Statute
The refusal to classify either "women" or "homosexuals" as a
particular social group defeats the purpose of protection embodied
in asylum law because it results in the denial of the claims of
applicants who face
real risks of harm upon return to their
129
countries of origin.

Although legislative history on the intended scope of the term
"particular social group," both in its original formulation in the
Protocol and in its subsequent adoption by the United States in the
Convention and the Refugee Act, is limited, the few statements that
are available are consistent with broad interpretation of the term
that is necessary to extend its application to those who are
persecuted on account of gender or sexual orientation. The
Convention's definition of "refugee"' 3 ° was intended to be broad,
in order to include all persons who were victims of international
human rights violations.' Membership in a particular social
group as a ground for asylum was introduced as "a last minute
12'

E.g., Tenorio, slip op. at 14 (relying on a decision of the Immigration and

Refugee Board of Canada, CRDD T91-14495, April 9, 1992, in determining that
a homosexual should be granted asylum); see Goldberg, supra note 43, at 622.
129 Bower, supra note 59, at 201.
130

[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence ...

is unable or, owing to such

fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention, supra note 10, at Art.1(A)(2).
The Convention also limited the application of the term to events that had
taken place before January 1, 1951. Convention, supra note 10, at Art. 1(A)(2).
13 Arthur Helton, Persecutionon Account of Membership in a Social Group
as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 39, 42 n.16
(1983).
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amendment" to the Convention's definition of "refugee" without
any significant discussion that would aid in interpretation of the
term. 132 Because no contrary intent was expressed, the particular
social group category should be interpreted consistently with the
general intent of the statute and should apply to broadly based
groups. "Once a person is subjected to a measure of such gravity
that we consider it 'persecution,' that person is 'persecuted' in the
sense of the Convention, irrespective of how many others are
subjected to the same or similar measures. ,133
Through the Refugee Act, Congress intended to give "statutory
meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."'' 34 The term "particular social group" was
intended to offer protection to those whose human rights were
violated and who were not included under any other classification
of the refugee provision. 31 U.S. courts have viewed it as a
"flexible concept designed to protect aggregations of humanity
which otherwise might not be protected from persecution under the
refugee definition.' ' 136 Thus, legislative history supports extending
the term "particular social group" to those who are persecuted on
account of broadly based characteristics.
B. The Real Problem
Another argument against broadly interpreting the term
"particular social group" is that the granting of asylum to an
individual woman or homosexual in a country where violence
against such groups is common ignores the real problem: there is
132

HATHAWAY,

supra note 63, at 157.

133 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

213 (1966)
(quoted in Felicite Stairs & Lori Pope, No PlaceLike Home: Assaulted Migrant
Women's Claims to Refugee Status and Landings on Humanitarian and
Compassionate Grounds, 6 J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 148, 171 (1990)).

Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C. (1982)).
131 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); see
also S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141.
36 See Helton, supra note 132, at 39; see also Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at
134

1576.
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a severe human rights violation, which is condoned in the country
allowing the persecution. Thus, where an alien is persecuted on
account of his or her membership in a "social group," and the
alleged "persecution" is based on a longstanding and generally
accepted practice or value in the country from which the person is
seeking asylum, relief is better directed toward correcting the
situation in the persecuting country.
Although it may be equally important from a humanitarian
perspective to direct relief toward the cause of the problem, this
realization should not preclude aiding those who have already
suffered from the effect of the problem.
C. The Force of Moral Arguments
"Americans have traditionally expressed great pride in their
'
nation's openness and hospitality to immigrants and refugees." 137
Basic moral tenets, common to most Americans, must be considered in guiding judicial interpretation of the "particular social
group" under asylum law. Principles such as "equal moral worth"
and the "duty to avoid depriving others of life and liberty"' 38 are
traditional American values that support extending the social group
to include those persecuted on account of gender or sexual
orientation.
The competing moral argument is, of course, that the United
States owes a duty to its own citizens. If it is unduly burdensome
on the United States to accept refugees, who might drain the
economy by making use of government entitlements and competing
with citizens for employment, the United States has an obligation
to limit the number of aliens granted refugee status.
Thus, from a moral perspective, defining U.S. immigration
policy requires a balancing of the interests of the Unites States with
the interests of the potential asylee. The interest of preventing the
' John A. Scanlon & O.T. Kent, The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just
Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe: The Contemporary American
Example, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? 61, 82-83 (Mark Gibney ed.,

1988).

13' Andrew E. Shacknove, American Duties to Refugees, in OPEN BORDERS?
CLOSED SOCIETIES? 131, 138 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988).
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slight economic burden on American citizens pales in comparison
to the interest of protecting the lives of those who are persecuted
on account of membership in a particular social group.'39
CONCLUSION

U.S. courts have inconsistently construed the term "particular
social group" as it applies in asylum law. One of the greatest
obstacles to many asylum claims that are based on persecution on
account of membership in a social group is that groups defined by
broadly based characteristics are frequently not recognized by U.S.
courts. Gender and sexual orientation based groups are clear
examples of such groups. Upon consideration of the principles of
statutory interpretation, the lack of evidence that the recognition of
broadly based groups will lead to a substantial increase in the
number of aliens seeking asylum, comparative law, legislative
intent and moral considerations, it is evident that the breadth of a
social group is not a proper consideration in determining whether
the group is cognizable under asylum law.

'3 Peter Singer & Renata Singer, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, in OPEN
BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? 121, 122 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988). The approach
favored by the Singers is "the principle of equal consideration of interests."

